A classroom model of global warming, fossil fuel depletion and the optimal carbon tax is formulated and calibrated. It features iso-elastic fossil fuel demand, stock-dependent fossil fuel extraction costs, an exogenous interest rate and no decay of the atmospheric stock of carbon. The optimal carbon tax reduces emissions from burning fossil fuel, both in the short and medium run. Furthermore, it brings forward the date that renewables take over from fossil fuel and encourages the market to keep more fossil fuel locked up. A renewables subsidy induces faster fossil fuel extraction and thus accelerates global warming during the fossil fuel phase, but brings forward the carbon-free era, locks up more fossil fuel reserves and thus ultimately curbs cumulative carbon emissions and global warming. For relatively large subsidies social welfare is more likely to fall as the economic costs rises more than proportionally with the size of the subsidy. Our calibration suggests that such subsidies are not a good second-best climate policy.
Introduction
Global warming is one of the biggest challenges facing our planet. The best way to deal with this is to price carbon via either a global carbon tax or a global market for tradable emission permits. The price of carbon should in a first-best world be equal to the social cost of carbon, which corresponds to the present value of all future marginal global warming damages. As a result of pricing carbon appropriately, carbon emissions are curbed by substituting away from fossil fuel to renewable energy and other production factors, more fossil fuel reserves are locked up in the crust of the earth and the carbon-free era is brought forward. Furthermore, pricing carbon will make it attractive to also mitigate global warming with carbon capture & sequestration and research & development into renewables.
It is crucial to get a good grasp of the mechanisms underlying the effectiveness of the global carbon tax and also to have a quantitative assessment of the optimal carbon tax. Many empirical integrated assessment models of climate change have been developed for this purpose and yield useful estimates of the social cost of carbon starting from 5 to 35 $ per ton of carbon in 2010 and rising to $16 to $50 per ton in 2050 (e.g., the DICE, PAGE and FUND models described in Nordhaus (2008) , Hope (2006) and Tol (2002) , respectively), but the Stern Review obtains much higher estimates of the social cost of carbon with a much lower discount rate (e.g., Stern (2007) ). These models are often rather large and difficult to understand, so that it is not always clear what the underlying assumptions and the crucial parameters deriving the results are.
Our purpose is therefore to put forward a simple classroom model of climate change and to carefully discuss an illustrative and transparent calibration of this model. We then use this to derive the optimal carbon tax, the optimal amount of fossil fuel to leave untapped, and the optimal time for the commencement of the carbon-free era, and to compare these with the no-policy outcomes. We also use our model to discuss the adverse effects of the second-best policy of subsidizing renewables instead of the first-best policy of pricing carbon. Although this shortens the duration of the fossil fuel era and encourages the market to leave more fossil fuel unexploited compared with the no-policy scenario, it also leads to faster fossil fuel extraction rates and acceleration global warming which has been coined the Green Paradox by Sinn (2008) . Large renewables subsidies have proportionally larger economic costs and are thus more likely to be counterproductive from a welfare point of view. The first-best optimal carbon tax leads to slower fossil fuel extraction rates than under "laissez faire" and does not suffer from Green Paradox effects. The optimal carbon tax also locks up more fossil fuel in the crust of the earth.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses and calibrates a simple classroom model of how burning fossil fuel leads to more atmospheric carbon and thus to more global warming. Section 3 discusses various specifications that have been used to capture damages for global warming and puts forward a simple specification which captures that at higher levels of mean global temperature damages increase more than proportionally with temperature. Section 4 puts forward a partial equilibrium model of fossil fuel depletion, renewables and climate change and uses it to discuss and highlight how increases in the carbon tax rate and the renewables subsidy can result in Green Paradox effects. Section 5 discusses social welfare and shows that large renewables subsidies can not only damage green welfare, but can also damage overall welfare and thus be counterproductive. Section 6 derives the social optimum and the optimal carbon tax. Section 7 concludes.
Burning fossil fuel, atmospheric carbon and global warming
Burning fossil fuel leads to carbon emissions. About half of these return quickly to the oceans and the surface of the earth and the other half remains forever up in the atmosphere (e.g., Allen et al., 2009ab) .
We abstract from atmospheric decay of greenhouse gases, which is less unreasonable for CO2 than for methane. We also abstract from positive feedback effects, which may occur at higher temperatures.
Hence, the stock of carbon in the atmosphere E (measured in trillions ton of carbon or TtC) is simply:
(1) E = E 0 + 0.5 (S 0 -S) = 1.71  0.5 S,
where S is the stock of fossil fuel (also measured in TtC) and the subscript 0 indicates current levels. We set the current stock of atmospheric carbon to E 0 = 0.85 TtC, which corresponds to 2.13 TtCO2 (using the conversion factor 1kg carbon = 3.664 kg CO2) or to 400 parts per million of CO2 (in May 2013).
Cumulative use of fossil fuel from now onwards is given by S 0  S. Proven reserves refer to reserves that are profitable to exploit current price and cost conditions. Initial reserves (S 0 ) are much larger and to a certain extent arbitrary, since it is difficult to know how much reserves will be profitable when fossil fuel prices have reached a much higher level. Typically, more less accessible fields will become worthwhile as prices rise. Hence, specification of the dependence of extraction costs on cumulative fossil fuel use is more important than the initial value of S 0 . We will calibrate the initial stock of fossil fuel reserves so that it produces the current price of fossil fuel (see section 4 for this calibration), which gives S 0 = 1.72
TtC. This is more than twice proven and listed reserves 1 but if the market price is right it will be economically feasible to extract more fossil fuel from the crust of the earth.
The temperature response to a broad range of carbon dioxide carbon pathways can be found from ensemble simulations of simple climate-carbon-cycle models which are constrained by observations and projects from more comprehensive models (Allen et al., 2009b) . These simulations suggest that limiting cumulative emissions to 1 TtC leads to a mostly likely peak global mean warming of 2 o C above preindustrial (1900) temperature, with a 5-95% confidence interval of 1.3 o to 3.9 o C. These simulations also suggest that the relationship between cumulative emissions and peak warming is remarkably insensitive to the timing of emissions or the peak emission rate. Hence, policy targets based on limiting cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide are likely to be more robust to scientific uncertainty than carbon emission rate or concentration targets. We use these findings to calibrate the following temperature module:
(2)
where T denotes peak global mean warming in degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperature. Since 1
TtC of carbon leads to a warming of 2 o Celsius, we have  = 2. The pre-industrial concentration of carbon is 0.581TtC and corresponds to 0 o C, hence we have 0 = 2 +  ln(0.581) which gives  = 3.683. This corresponds to the current temperature of 1.4 o Celsius above pre-industrial global mean temperature.
Although there is a lag between global mean temperature and the carbon stock of about 70 years, we ignore it. This will bias our estimate of the social cost of carbon and optimal carbon tax upwards as can be seen from comparing Liski and Gerlagh (2012) with Golosov et al. (2013) . These two damage ratios imply that half of world GDP is lost at, respectively, 19 o and 12 o Celsius. This seems rather too small, because human mankind let alone economic production will cease at these temperatures. To get higher and more realistic damages at higher temperatures, Weitzman (2012) suggests that output damages might be 50% of world GDP at 6 o C and 99% at 12 o C. Combining the lowtemperature damages of Nordhaus (2008) and Hanemann (2008) with the high-temperature damages of
Weitzman (2012), Ackerman and Stanton (2012) arrive at the following net GDP ratios: 
where 0 p denotes the current market price of fossil fuel which corresponds to about 9 US$ per million BTU or 470 US$ per ton of carbon. This quadratic specification does not fit too badly at both low and higher levels of global warming.
Social cost of carbon
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is defined in the usual manner as the present value of all future marginal global warming damages resulting from burning an extra unit of fossil fuel:
SCC e D E t Y e dt e D E S S t dt
where r * denotes the interest rate, g denotes the trend rate of growth in real world GDP and Y 0 is the initial level of world GDP (which is set to its 2012 value of 70 trillion US$). We use the interest rate rather than the rate of time preference, since we are discounting marginal damages in units of lost production. For our calculations we use an exogenous and constant growth-corrected real interest rate of r  r *  g = 1%.
For the These estimates of the social cost of carbon are rather high, which is consequence of using a rather low growth-corrected discounted rate r. If a higher rate of time preference, more intergenerational inequality aversion and/or a lower growth rate of the economy (and thus of global warming damages) is used, these estimates would be rather smaller. 4 For example, if the growth-corrected discount rate is 3% instead of 1%, the social cost of carbon would be curbed by two thirds to 51 US$/tC for the Nordhaus damages and 113 US$/tC for the Haneman damages. These estimates of the social cost of carbon are more in line with the ballpark estimates used in popular discussions.
For the other damage functions the social cost of carbon varies with time as it depends on the time paths of the stock of atmospheric carbon or of cumulative fossil fuel use. However, as we abstract from decay of atmospheric carbon, the SCC is constant throughout the carbon-free era and only depends on the stock of atmospheric carbon at the end of the fossil fuel era, E(t F ), or the stock of untapped fossil fuel, S(t F ),
where t F denotes the moment of time when the fossil fuel era ends and the carbon-free era starts. For the Nordhaus-Weitzman and Hanemann-Weitzman models we substitute the temperature module (1) and the atmospheric carbon stock equation (2) into (4) to calculate the SCC at the end of the carbon-free era from which moment onwards the stock of untapped fossil fuel is constant:
The SCC for our specification (3) 
Effects of carbon taxes and renewables subsidies on market outcomes
We assume that there is a renewable backstop energy source which does not emit carbon and also assume that this is a perfect substitute for fossil fuel and has an infinitely elastic supply. For illustrative purposes, we suppose that the cost of renewables, b, is 50% more expensive than the current market price of fossil fuel to reflect that solar, wind and other forms of renewable energy are not competitive yet, so that 0 1.5 705 bp  US$/etC. These are bold assumptions. For example, wind or solar energy suffer from intermittence problems and require energy storage which oil, gas or coal do not. Renewables are thus in practice imperfect substitutes for fossil fuel. Furthermore, the supply of renewables is not necessarily infinitely elastic, because a rising price of energy may induce an expanding supply of renewables. Still, these assumptions about the backstop allow us to get precise insights which will help us to understand the impacts of optimal climate policy on transition times and untapped fossil fuel.
We assume that fossil fuel extraction becomes more costly as more reserves have been depleted, because then the 'low hanging fruit' has been extracted from the earth and less accessible fields or mines have to be explored. Indeed, the so-called Herfindahl rule states that it is optimal to deplete the least-cost reserves first. Furthermore, we assume that extraction costs become infinitely large as reserves are fully depleted.
Hence, if the cost of extracting 1 TtC of fossil fuel is given by G(S), we have G < 0 and S  of the current market price. This seems high, but this figure is meant to correspond to an average for oil, natural gas and coal. Consequently, the rent for relatively abundant coal is much lower and for scarce and limited oil and gas the rent is higher.
The user cost of fossil fuel is , qp  where p is the market price of fossil fuel and  the specific carbon tax. For the time being we consider exogenous changes in  . In section 6 we derive the optimal social cost of carbon and global carbon tax. We assume that in both cases the carbon tax revenues are rebated in lump-sum fashion to the private sector. We also consider subsidies  on the use of renewables, which are financed by levying lump-sum taxes which do not distort behaviour of households and firms.
How much fossil fuel does the market leave untapped in the crust of the earth?
Since current fossil fuel prices are lower than the cost of renewables, the fossil fuel era ends at the point in time t F where the user cost of fossil fuel (q) reaches the cost of renewables (b) net of the subsidy ().
Since at the end of the fossil fuel era fossil fuel is obsolete, the scarcity rent on fossil fuel must be zero.
Hence, the user cost of fossil fuel at the end of the fossil fuel era must equal the extraction cost plus the carbon tax:
To be indifferent between fossil fuel and renewables at that point of time, this user cost of fossil fuel must equal the cost of renewables, b  . We thus find that the optimal amount of fossil fuel to be left in the crust of the earth at the end of the fossil fuel era is:
Under "laissez faire" there are no taxes or subsidies, hence (5) indicates that the market outcome locks up 0.67 TtC of fossil fuel in the crust of the earth. Cumulative fossil fuel use is 1.05 TtC which is three to four times bigger than the carbon budget of 0.3 TtC discussed above. The corresponding stock of atmospheric carbon is from equation (2) given by 1.37 TtC, which yields from equation (1) 
Demand for fossil fuel and renewables
To understand more about the dynamic adjustment paths and to be able to calculate the timing of the advent of the carbon-free era, we need to make additional assumptions about fossil fuel demand. Suppose therefore that the elasticity of market demand is constant and given by  = 0.85, so that demand for fossil is given by 
Calibration of initial fossil fuel reserves and "laissez faire" outcome
The fossil fuel phase of the market outcome follows from the two additional differential equations: (7) (8) in terms of the user cost of fossil fuel.
The differential equations (7) and (8) can be solved over the time interval [0, t F ] with reserves pinned down at the start by S 0 and the user cost of fossil fuel pinned down at the end by q(t F ) = 705 US$/tC. The time of the fossil fuel phase t F is determined in such a way that the end condition (5) is satisfied. 5 We first solved this system under "laissez faire" to calibrate the initial stock of fossil fuel reserves. We did this by choosing S 0 and t F given q(0) = p(0) = 470 US$/tC, q(t F ) = 705 US$/etC and S(t F ) = 0.67 TtC. This yielded S 0 = 1.72 TtC, which we then used as our calibrated estimate of initial reserves as already mentioned when discussing the carbon accumulation equation (1). This calibration procedure also yielded a length of the fossil fuel era of t F = 138 years under "laissez faire". The solid brown lines in fig. 4 below give the dynamic adjustment paths under "laissez faire". Since there are no carbon taxes, the user cost of fossil fuel equals the market price of fossil fuel. As fossil fuel prices rise, fossil fuel use and carbon emissions fall, global warming increases less rapidly from the current level of 1.4 o Celsius. At the end of the fossil fuel era, renewables take over and the global mean temperature stays at 3.2 o Celsius. Of course, in practice the stock of carbon will decay slowly and the global mean temperature will slowly fall again but we abstract from this. 5 We solve this two-point-boundary-value problem (TPBVP) computationally by nesting a 4 th -order Runge-Kutta algorithm for solving equations (7) and (8) into a Gauss-Newton algorithm for solving for t F and q(0) (or for t F and S(0) for the calibration simulation) to ensure that the boundary conditions at times 0 and t F are satisfied. We do this in EXCEL by nesting the 4 th -order Runge-Kutta algorithm from the add-on POPTOOLS in the SOLVER routine. 
Anticipated carbon taxes
It is a well known result that, if extraction costs are zero and all fossil fuel reserves are fully used up, introducing a specific carbon tax  that rises over time at the rate of interest r leaves fossil fuel extraction and reserves paths completely unaffected. This can be seen immediately from the last two terms in equation (8) dropping out. In this case, the user price of fossil fuel including the carbon tax, the producer price of fossil fuel excluding the carbon tax and the carbon tax itself all increase at the rate of interest.
However, we have assumed that extraction costs are non-zero and stock-dependent. Furthermore, we have assumed that costs become infinitely large as reserves get fully depleted so that we get partial exhaustion as can be seen from the strictly positive solution for S(t F ) from equation (5). A carbon tax that grows at the interest rate r is then not neutral, since it reduces the amount of fossil fuel that is locked up at the end of the fossil fuel era S(t F ) and thus curbs cumulative emissions and global warming.
A credible future carbon tax that is to be implemented in the near or distant future or a carbon tax that rises at a faster rate than the interest rate induces fossil fuel owners to extract fossil fuel more rapidly than under "laissez faire" and thus accelerates global warming. This is known as the Green Paradox (Sinn, 2008) . However, such a rapidly rising carbon tax will also lead to more fossil fuel being locked up in the crust of the earth at the end of the fossil fuel phase which mitigates global warming and might reverse the Green Paradox. For the sake of brevity we will illustrate such effects with a renewables subsidy.
Renewables subsidies and Green Paradox effects
Before we discuss our simulation results for renewables subsidies, we briefly discuss their effects for the case where extraction costs are zero and fossil fuel reserves are fully exhausted. The fossil fuel price, fossil fuel use, the stock of remaining fossil fuel and the duration of the fossil fuel phase are then: 
A renewables subsidy ( > 0) thus depresses the rising time path for the user cost of fossil fuel, lifts up the declining time path for fossil fuel use and cuts the duration of the fossil fuel phase. 6 We thus see that a renewables subsidy increases carbon emissions and accelerates global warming in line with the so-called Green Paradox. Once we allow for stock-dependent extraction cost, this adverse effect on global warming may be offset by a beneficial effect on global warming of locking up more fossil fuel in the crust of the earth at the end of the fossil fuel era.
For our model with stock-dependent extraction costs, the solid yellow lines in fig. 4 give the time paths if the cost of renewables is reduced from 705 to 564 US$/etC with a 20% subsidy ( = 0.2). We notice five effects. First, the time it takes to transition to the carbon-free era t F shortens from 138.5 to 102 years.
Second, as mentioned above, the stock of fossil fuel that is left forever locked up in the crust of the earth S(t F ) increases from 0.67 to 0.82 TtC. This curbs the long-run stock of atmospheric carbon from 1.375 to 1.29 TtC, so that long-run global warming is reduced from 3.2 o to 2.9 o Celsius. Third, despite curbing global warming in the long run, fossil fuel use is ramped up during the fossil fuel phase which accelerates global warming before the carbon-free era commences. This effect is known as the Green Paradox:
owners of fossil fuel reserves pump their fossil fuel up more quickly for fear of their reserves becoming less worth as a result of the cheaper renewables. Fossil fuel prices are lower due to the induced fossil fuel glut. The price of fossil fuel jumps down on impact from 470 to 438 US$/tC and converges at the end of the fossil fuel era to 564 US$/tC instead of 705 US$/tC. Fourth, the scarcity rent on fossil fuel is obviously lower as a result of the renewables subsidy and the induced faster pumping of fossil fuel and ends up being zero at the end of the fossil-fuel era. Finally, fossil fuel use at the end of the fossil fuel phase must equal renewables use (from the continuity of the path for energy prices). As a result of the subsidy, final energy use jumps up from 6.76 to 7.95 eGtC.
The effects of doubling the renewables subsidy to 40% can be seen from the green lines in fig. 4 . Green Paradox effects are amplified, but cumulative fossil fuel use and global warming are curbed by more.
A renewables subsidy is often advocated as second-best alternative to an optimal carbon tax, because electorates prefer the 'carrot' to the 'stick'. There are three problems with such a strategy. First, global warming first gets worse before it gets better. Second, although green welfare may increase, overall welfare may fall (see section 5). Third, if electorates notice that global warming may worsen during the fossil fuel phase, they might undermine the credible announcement of offering renewables subsidies and thereby destroy the effectiveness of climate policy altogether.
Welfare: Are large renewables subsidies counterproductive?
The global planner maximizes global social welfare W(0), which is defined by the present discounted value of the difference between, on the one hand, the consumer surplus, and, on the other hand, the sum of fossil fuel extraction costs, renewables costs and global warming damages:
U F t R t G S t bR t D E t e dt A F t R t Ft bR t S S t p e dt St
The consumer surplus is defined as the area under the demand curve, so
Since carbon taxes are rebated in lump-sum fashion, they do not appear in this expression. The same is true for renewables subsidies, which are financed by lump-sum taxes. Substituting the demand curve, the carbon accumulation equation (1) and the expression for renewables use (6), we rewrite the expression for global social welfare (9) as:
Does a renewables subsidy hurt social welfare?
To convert the change in welfare under the 20% subsidy from the "laissez-faire" outcome into monetary units, we divide the welfare change by the marginal utility of initial consumption of fossil fuel (which equals one under quasi-linear preferences) and express it as a percentage of initial world GDP. This gives a present value welfare gain for the 20% renewables subsidy of 7.3% of world GDP, so that for this case the welfare gains from the ultimate reduction in global warming from 3. need not improve global social welfare, especially for large subsidies. It is also easy to see that these subsidies are more likely to be counterproductive if the interest rate is larger, because then the welfare gains from the ultimate curbing of global warming are discounted more heavily. Table 1 summarizes these impact and long-run effects under "laissez faire" and under a 20% and 40% renewables subsidy. We now consider the social optimum. 
Social optimum and the optimal carbon tax
The social optimum follows from maximizing expression (9) or (9) for global social welfare W(0) subject to the fossil depletion equation (7) and the carbon accumulation equation 0.5 , (0) 0.85 E F E  TtC (see van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012a) and the appendix). The social optimum has an initial phase where fossil fuel is used exclusively followed from time t F onwards by a final phase where renewables are used exclusively. As before, this result derives from the assumptions that fossil fuel and renewables are perfect substitutes and renewables supply is infinitely elastic. Furthermore, it can be established that the time path of the optimal carbon tax always slopes upwards and is concave. This result requires no decay of the stock of atmospheric carbon. Intuitively, individual owners of fossil fuel reserves internalize that further depletion of their reserves forces them to go to less accessible fields and therefore as the fossil fuel phase continues their extraction costs rise and their use of fossil fuel is curbed. This is the reason why the rise in the carbon tax flattens off as reserves diminish. Finally, the social optimum can be realized in a market economy by setting the specific carbon tax equal to the social cost of carbon. There is no role for a renewables subsidy in the social optimum. However, if there are learning by doing effects in renewables use, a renewables subsidy is required to internalize these effects (e.g., Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2013) .
At the switch from the fossil fuel phase to the renewable phase, we have ( ) 6.6 F Rt  eTtC from equation (6) and thus we also have ( ) 6.6
GtC. Hence, the social price of fossil fuel at the time of the switch must equal q(t F ) = b = 705 US$/tC (from continuity in the time path of the social price of energy). The optimal amount of fossil fuel to lock up in the earth at the start of the carbon-free era follows from:
The solution to equation (5) is S(t F ) = 1.28 TtC with our calibrates values for the interest rate, r = 0.01, and the initial stock of fossil fuel reserves, S 0 = 1.72 TtC. Hence, the optimal ultimate stock of atmospheric carbon is E(t F ) = 1.07 TtC and the corresponding level of global warming follows from the temperature module (2) 7 We solve this again by nesting a Runge-Kutta for integrating the ordinary differential equations (7) and (8) into a Gauss-Newton algorithm for solving the three terminal boundary conditions for the appropriate values of q(0),  (0) and t F . Using the addins POPTOOLS and Solver this can be done within a simple Excel sheet.
If the specific carbon tax  is set to the social cost of carbon determined by equation (10), the Hotelling rule for the market economy (8) becomes the Hotelling rule for the social optimum (8). Hence, with this carbon tax the market economy exactly replicates the social optimum. Using this result and integrating equation (10) with (5) forward in time, we get the optimal carbon tax as the present value of future marginal global warming damages: 
This yields an initial carbon tax of 311 US$/tC which rises monotonically at a decreasing rate towards a tax of 338 US$/tC at the switch time 65 years later. It does so at a decreasing rate, since fossil fuel producers curb their rates of extraction as reserves are depleted and become less accessible. This carbon tax corresponds to roughly 85 $-cents on a gallon of gasoline or 17 Euro-cents on a litre of petrol.
The dotted blue lines in fig. 4 plot the resulting time paths and the optimal carbon tax (i.e., the social cost of carbon) and the components of the optimal user cost of energy are plotted in fig. 5 . Table 1 above also summarizes the impact and long-run effects under the optimal carbon tax.
Compared with "laissez faire", the social optimum leads to a present-value welfare gain of 71.7% of world GDP. In annuity terms this is a gain of 0.7% of world GDP. The duration of the optimal fossil fuel phase (65 years) is substantially shorter than under "laissez faire" (138 years). The relatively flat time path for the optimal carbon tax manages to curb cumulative fossil use from 1050 to 437 GtC which corresponds to an average annual use of 6.7 GtC instead of 7.6 GtC under "laissez faire". The social optimum thus does not suffer from the Green Paradox as can be seen from the time paths for fossil fuel depletion in the third panel of fig. 4 .
If policy makers are less precautionary and adopt a higher interest rate (say, r = 0.015), the time path for the optimal carbon tax is lowered throughout. The carbon tax thus rises from 217 to 278 US$/TC as can be seen from the purple line in fig. 5 . Hence, carbon emissions are higher during the fossil fuel phase.
Furthermore, the duration of the fossil fuel phase increases from 65 to 112 years. Cumulative carbon emissions are therefore much higher, namely 777 TtC instead of 437 TtC. Average yearly emissions are only a bit higher, namely 6.9 GtC instead of 6.7 GtC. Ultimate global warming is higher also.
If initial reserves are 10% higher which is probably most of what can be expected from the shale gas revolution, the time path for the optimal carbon tax has to be steepened to slow down extraction. The optimal policy is thus to have initially a lower carbon tax (292 US$/tC instead of 311 US$/tC) but end up with a larger carbon tax (373 US$/tC instead of 338 US$/tC). The time it takes before the fossil fuel era is taken over by the renewables is longer (84 instead of 65 years Renewables subsidies of 20 and 40% lead to higher cumulative fossil fuel use than the social optimum but less than under "laissez faire", namely 883 and 604 GtC, respectively. However, these renewables subsidies induce higher average fossil fuel use than under "laissez faire", namely 8.7 and 10.5 GtC per year, respectively. This confirms that renewables subsidies suffer, in contrast to the optimal carbon tax, from Green Paradox effects. Global warming is curbed more under the optimal carbon tax (2.2 o Celsius) than with renewables subsidies (2.9 o Cand 2.5 o C) and thus more than under "laissez faire" (3.2 o Celsius). would all reduce the social cost of carbon and the optimal global carbon tax. A more short-sighted policy with a higher interest rate leads to more fossil fuel use, postpones the advent of the carbon-free era and leaves less fossil fuel locked up in the earth, hence leads ultimately to more global warming. The resulting global carbon tax is lower, both in the short and higher in the long run. More intergenerational inequality aversion also means that there is less willingness of current generations to sacrifice consumption for a less future global warming. Hence, the optimal global carbon tax is smaller and there is more fossil fuel use, a later introduction of renewables and more global warming.
A renewables subsidy 20% shortens the fossil fuel phase by 36 years and locks up 167 GtC more fossil than under "laissez faire". This contributes to mitigating global warming, but the subsidy also elicits the market to extract fossil fuel more rapidly which causes acceleration of global warming during the fossil fuel phase. These Green Paradox effects worsen welfare. But with a 20% subsidy the overall effect is a small annuity gain in welfare of 0.07% of world GDP. However, with larger renewables subsidies the combined negative welfare effects from lower utility of fossil fuel consumption and higher global warming damages associated with the Green Paradox increase by more than the potential green welfare gains of bringing the carbon-free era forward and locking up more fossil fuel. For example, with a subsidy of 40% limits global warming to 2.52 o Celsius but nevertheless leads to an annuity welfare loss of 0.02% of world GDP as the Green Paradox effects have started to dominate. Renewables subsidies thus reduce global warming damages in the long run, but they will harm overall global social welfare if they are too large. This is more likely for higher interest rates arising from, say, a higher rate of time preference or more intergenerational inequality aversion. In general, renewables subsidies are not a helpful second-best climate policy. The optimal carbon tax does a better job at flattening the time path for the market price of fossil fuel whilst not lowering the entire price path and thereby causing Green Paradox effects. Of course, renewables subsidies are warranted if there are failures in R&D into renewables or there are learning-by-doing effects in the use of renewables.
Our calibrations and calculations of the effects of the optimal carbon tax and various renewables subsides are purely illustrative and designed to be used in the classroom. They are meant to highlight the various effects at play as clearly as possible in the simplest possible model with endogenous timing of the advent of the carbon-free era and the optimal amount of fossil fuel reserves to leave untapped. More realistic models of the optimal global carbon tax will have to allow for general equilibrium effects and the role of capital markets. For example, Green Paradox effects will typically be mitigated as the interest rate is pushed down as oil producers invest the proceeds from faster resource extraction. More general models need to examine the effects on global warming of an endogenous interest rate under Ramsey growth as in Golosov et al. (2013) , van der Ploeg and Withagen (2013) , Gerlagh and Liski (2012) , Rezai et al. (2012) and Rezai and van der Ploeg (2013) or under endogenous growth with directed technical change as in Acemoglu et al. (2012) . They also have to allow for different types of fossil fuel (oil, natural gas, coal and unconventional sources such as shale gas and tar sands) and renewables. Using shale gas and switching from coal to gas gives a window of opportunity to develop cost-effective renewables before global warming becomes intolerable as discussed in van der Ploeg and Withagen (2012b) . They must allow the various sources of energy to be imperfect substitutes for the capital-labour aggregate as discussed in Hassler et al. (2011) . It is also important to take account of gas being a good substitute for coal in electricity generation and a good substitute for oil in transport as discussed in Helm (2012) and to allow for an upward-sloping supply of renewables. Finally, it is important to allow for different national jurisdictions and consider the conflict and cooperation that might evolve between different types of carbon-emitting countries in a multi-region world as, for example, in Hassler and Krusell (2012) and to allow for the strategic conflict arising from oil importers putting a tariff component in their carbon tax to cream off part of the scarcity rent enjoyed by oil producers and oil producers trying to cream off part of the climate rent of oil importers as discussed in Liski and Tahvonen (2004) . Ploeg and Withagen (2012a) and (2012b) we extend this framework to allow for an upwardsloping supply of renewables and for different types of fossil fuel (oil/gas and coal).
